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Abstract— The ad-hoc methodology that is prevalent in today’s
testing and evaluation of network intrusion detection algorithms
and systems makes it difficult to compare different algorithms
and approaches. After conducting a survey of the literature on
the methods and techniques being used, it can be seen that a new
approach that incorporates an open source testing methodology
and environment would benefit the information assurance
community. After summarizing the literature and presenting
several example test and evaluation environments that have been
used in the past, we propose a new open source evaluation
environment and methodology for use by researchers and
developers of new intrusion detection and denial of service
detection and prevention algorithms and methodologies.
Index Terms—Intrusion Detection Testing, Network Security,
Network Attack Generation, Hacker Tools
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1998, DARPA initiated the Intrusion Detection
Evaluation [8-12] program. These evaluations involved
generating background traffic interlaced with malicious
activity so that intrusion detection systems and algorithms
could be tested and compared. Although these tests and the
resulting data were very valuable, after 1999 this evaluation
environment and methodology has not been continued. In
2000, the Lincoln Adaptable Real-time Information Assurance
Test-bed (LARIAT) effort was initiated.  This effort resulted
in custom software that emulates network traffic from a small
network connected to the Internet. By 2001, LARIAT had the
ability to perform approximately 50 attacks against 9
operating systems [26].  Unfortunately, LARIAT is only
available for use under special circumstances, thus it is not
available to the Information Assurance community as a whole. 
Since neither LARIAT nor an updated DARPA
environment is openly available, inventors of new information
assurance algorithms and techniques have no accepted,
standard method for evaluating their algorithms and
implementations. The most common methodology is to create
a small test network and release malicious activity in that self-
contained small network environment. The network
architecture, complexity and capabilities are totally
unspecified in general, and no standard comprehensive
recommendations appear to exist. A second methodology also
used is to capture network traffic from an existing production
network and play it back on a test network segment using
tools such as “tcpreplay” [47]. The disadvantage of this
second approach is that new attacks are not easily inserted into
the existing traffic data files.  Neither of these approaches has
been widely effective in evaluating intrusion detection or
intrusion prevention systems, due to the inability to generate
network traffic data from a large variety of environments and
conditions.
The use of “complete traffic” is necessary for realistic
information assurance system testing [22]. In general the issue
of traffic generation is one of the most difficult ones to tackle.
Synthetic traffic does not represent the realities of an actual
network.  Synthetic load generators, like SmartBits hardware
traffic generators, were designed for load-testing bridges and
routers, which typically do not examine packet payloads [22].
They produce pseudo-random TCP frames.  The traffic
generated by these tools is usually not suitable for use in
information assurance evaluation environments, since actual
traffic is not random.  Statistical models that take into account
daily patterns of computer usage with random deviations may
be used to describe user behavior, and have been be used to
extrapolate the traffic produced by legitimate users.  However,
the user models produced to date have been site and
application specific and do not carry the generality necessary
to be useful for evaluation purposes.  
Software testing approaches have used scripting tools to
create synthetic “Web browsers”, as well as FTP and Telnet
users. Their sessions last random periods of time.  These
methods seldom model actual user behavior, and thus this
approach is nearly equivalent to the random packet generation
approach. Traffic generators designed for testing web servers
have more realistic profiles because the type of traffic created
is by design like Internet traffic [22].  In testing web servers,
the offered load becomes an issue because overloading a
server resembles a DOS attack.  More over, types of URL and
data returned from the server influence the response of the
traffic generation system.  Scripting tools are commonly used
to emulate users engaging in browsing the Internet.  
Reviewing the intrusion detection system testing and
benchmarking literature, it becomes clear that present
approaches to testing are inadequate.  A large number of
unrelated tests, such as [29,3,32,34-39,43-45], can be brought
into use.  Most of these tests assess susceptibility to a single
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weakness or single weakness area.  We do not believe that
there is ever going to be a comprehensive test nor a single
methodology that would examine an intrusion detection
system for every attack, verify its abilities and identify all its
weaknesses [28].  This in essence would categorically solve
the problem of intrusion detection.  However, it is possible to
improve on the existing practices employed in the field.  In
particular, a common framework for testing, as in this paper,
would greatly simplify and expedite running a wide variety of
test scenarios.
II. EXISTING TOOLS AND TESTING METHODOLOGIES
The predominant open source philosophy for testing
intrusion detection systems in 2002 is to create an
individualized test environment. This means searching for
existing exploits (attacks) and then embedding these exploits
into the individualized test networks. Background traffic is
mixed with the exploits to hide the exploits in benign
environments. Volume and traffic data rates are controlled so
as to have the ability to determine at which points the
intrusion detection algorithm or platform begins to have
trouble keeping up the total traffic. While not presenting an
exhaustive list of these environments or individual tools, the
next subsections summarize a few of the tools and
environments used for creating intrusion detection evaluation
environments. A more comprehensive list of tools may be
found at [49] which is a list of the 50 most popular network
security tools.
A. DARPA Environment
The DARPA 1998 and 1999 intrusion detection evaluations
represent the first significantly systematic effort to test
intrusion detection systems. Their focus was not on testing
complete systems but evaluating technical approaches [26].  In
the first evaluations in 1998, the state of intrusion detection
was unknown.  The designers of the environment had to
overcome the considerable problem of no pre-existing effort.
No previous effort meant that there were no standard
comparison metrics, standard attacks, standard background
traffic or existing methodology [10].
The general approach to testing was the following.  An
off-line and an on-line evaluation were executed.  In the off-
line evaluation, a set of seven weeks of training data was
provided to vendors.  This consisted of sessions, which were
marked as normal, or as attacks.  The off line training data
was intended to use as a tool for the intrusion detection system
experts to tune and optimize their systems [11].  A second set
of two weeks of data was generated which was to be used for
actual testing. The tool tcpreplay was used to feed the traffic
to the evaluation systems. The results were analyzed and
presented to participants at a workshop [10].
The test designers were faced with three options when
deciding how to generate the traffic. The first option was to
collect real operational data and attack an actual organization.
The packets would be real, however it was unacceptable to
attack an actual organization.  Furthermore, releasing private
e-mails, passwords and user identities was not realistic.  The
next option was to actually go ahead and sanitize the data
collected and then introduce the attacks directly in the
sanitized data [5].   This approach was cumbersome and prone
to artifacts since attacks would be merged into real collected
traffic.  There was no other realistic option other than to
synthesize all sessions from scratch.  This option would
generate non-sensitive traffic similar to that seen on an
operational network.  Data could be distributed without fear of
breaching security. More over, it lent itself to automating
traffic generation.  In order to recreate realistic traffic four
months of data from Hanscom Air Force Base and 50 other
bases were analyzed [10]. 
The network traffic in this environment was Unix focused.
It included the following protocol/traffic activity: HTTP, X
Windows, SQL, SMTP, DNS, FTP, POP3, Finger, Telnet,
IRC, SNMP, and Time [10]. Thousands of hosts contributing
to background traffic were simulated but the number of
simulated users representing secretaries, programmers,
workers and so on were in the hundreds.  In the cases where
traffic was too complex to model with automata, human actors
were utilized to generate background traffic. The actual
content of FTP, HTTP and SMTP transfers was created
through statistical similarity to live traffic or was sampled
from public–domain sources [5]. A number of e-mails in the
network traffic were taken from public domain mail list
servers.  The rest maintained word and two-word sequence
statistics derived from a sample of 10,000 e-mails filtered with
a 40,000 word dictionary to remove names.  Telnet sessions
were recreated via statistical profiles of users.  These profiles
included the frequency of UNIX commands executed, typical
login times, session duration times, source and destination
addresses. Some of the computers maintained fixed IP
addresses while others changed addresses during the test [5].
Expect was used to control most of the automated sessions.
Human actors performed more complicated tasks such as
installing software.  In order to complete the testing
environment, attacks needed to be interjected into a volume of
background traffic.  120 different attacks spanning 38 attack
categories were introduced into the traffic [10].  Figure 1
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Figure 1 Attacks in the 1998 DARPA evaluation [10]
In addition to the methodology of using known attacks,
novel attacks were developed in order to test systems’
effectiveness against never-seen before attacks [10].  Many of
the attacks were analyzed beforehand to verify that they
function in the test bed.  That information was later used
further to improve on these attacks by making them stealthier
[5].  
 
The suggestions collected during the 1998 test shaped the
1999 DARPA test.  The goals of the evaluation shifted to
testing complete systems and the reasons they miss novel
attacks.  There were a number of changes and additions
summarized below [8]:
1. Victim Windows NT machines were added.
2. New stealthy attacks were added to avoid intrusion
detection system detection.
3. Two new types of analysis were performed:
a. An analysis of misses and high-scoring false alarms
to determine the cause of detection misses and false
alarms.
b. Participants were allowed to submit information
aiding in the identification of many attacks and their
appropriate response.
4. Another major point of focus was detection of novel
attacks without first training.
Scoring was restructured for the 1999 test.  The list files as
generated for the 1998 test made it difficult for the vendors to
submit easily scored alerts because of the complex nature of
alert generation.  Alerts were true positives if they occurred at
the time of attack and the correct victim’s IP was identified.
A 60 second grace period was allowed to account for network
latencies.  Intrusion detection systems were not penalized for
attacks for which they were not designed to detect [8].
The DARPA tests have been criticized extensively.  The
environment was build to test passive intrusion detection
systems.  The off-line part was very difficult to adapt for
systems that query network equipment and respond by
changing their configuration.  Furthermore, the information
recorded for the off-line test was simply not enough for
certain intrusion detection systems.  In general, recording
packet streams have proven inflexible as a testing method.
The complexity of packet streams necessary to test correlation
systems makes the DARPA approach not extendable [26].  
The DARPA data generation methodologies have been
critiqued because one of the expressed goals of the DARPA
evaluation was to create useable data for further testing by
others.    Criticisms included [15]:
1. No effort was made to validate its false alarm
characteristics.  It is unknown how many false alarms
background traffic alone would generate.
2. Neither the statistics of the real traffic nor the statistics
that the generated traffic was supposed to match, or the
methodology for proving the statistics correct, were ever
published.
3. Data rates and their variation with time was never a
variable in the DARPA tests.  What is more troublesome
is that there is suspicion that data rates in the order of
kilobits may have been used.
4. The attacks were evenly distributed throughout the
background traffic.  Each attack type was used the same
amount.  Both choices do not reflect network reality.
5. There are inconsistencies in the documentation found on
the DARPA tests.  
6. There was no control group employed in the testing.
7. The types of attacks used could guide one’s detection
focus on operating systems vulnerable to interactive
attacks.  
8. The size of training data may have been insufficient.
There is no proof that it presented intrusions to any
degree of realism or even that such data can be
constructed.
9. Some attacks had TTL characteristics that did not match
the background traffic. 
In spite of these criticisms, the DARPA tests and
methodology were a significant contribution to the
information assurance community and made significant
contributions toward identifying the complexities and
difficulties in testing and evaluating intrusion detection
algorithms. Test data is still used at present in 2002.
However, at present, the information assurance community
frowns upon further results and comparisons made with this
data. This is due largely to the fact that the time value of the
actual data has depreciated both through new and different
attacks today as well as having more time to customize and
calibrate intrusion detection algorithms. This means that it is
not fair to compare to results from algorithms used during the
time pressure of the DARPA tests. It is undesirable that there
is no presently publicly available existing equivalent
environment or methodology available for researchers to use
to evaluate the new generation of algorithms and
methodologies. These DARPA tests were a very positive
influence on the information assurance community.
B. LARIAT Environment
A recently developed follow on methodology and
environment is the Lincoln Adaptive Real-time Information
Assurance Test-bed (LARIAT) [23]. The motivation for
creating LARIAT was to provide “tools to assist in the
evaluation and configuration of information assurance (IA)
technologies” [23].  This was part of a larger effort to develop
a comprehensive testing environment for intrusion detection
systems, firewalls and access control lists.  It came about after
the DARPA 1999 IDS evaluation with the first release
becoming available in 2000.  In 2001, its capabilities had been
extended to include high throughput capabilities, attack
scenarios and Windows traffic in addition to being real-time,
deployable and fully automated.
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LARIAT “emulates the network traffic from a small
organization connected to the Internet” [23]. The user first
selects profiles for background traffic and attacks.  The attack
profiles include the type and strike time of the attack.  The
system goes through a network discovery phase during which
it verifies that everything is ready before the test begins.  In
the future, test engineers will not have to configure LARIAT
in order to specify the capabilities of the network.  The system
will do that by itself [23].  Then, it initializes the network
(clears logs and process table, removes old traffic and resets
accounts, etc.) and configures the hosts.  During the next step
the test’s conditions are set up.  Traffic and attack scripts are
generated.  Attacks are scheduled and logging services are
started.  The software allows the configuration of the
aggregate traffic generation including the attack distribution,
rate and amount of traffic.    Subsequently the test is run.
LARIAT allows the user to monitor the testing progress in
“real-time”. After completion of the test the attack logs are
examined and their success evaluated.  The final stage consists
of clean up.   All corrupted files and polluted process tables
are reinstated.  Services and other conditions necessary for the
test’s execution are terminated [23].   The system is fully
automated so after clean up the system will start the next
attack scenario by repeating the process from step two.  
Traffic generation in LARIAT is done through the use of
defined service models.  Some examples of the protocols used
are http, smtp, ftp, telnet and much more.  Further more the
system takes into account interactions between protocols.
Traffic volumes can be varied from 0-100Mbps according to
need.  In 2001, there were 50 attacks available for 9 different
operating systems. 
The system takes a unique approach to background traffic
generation.  The developers have modified a Linux Kernel
that would allow their software to generate traffic.  The traffic
emulates many hosts on the Internet.  There is a web interface
that allows evaluators to configure the traffic generation
between individual tests [26].  The traffic used is similar to
that used by the DARPA 1999 evaluations.  The user is
allowed to adjust the arrival rate and distribution of sessions
of each type [26].   More over, there are traffic profiles, on/off
time switches and zones can be added or removed.  Zones are
Internet domains or sub domains which contain real or virtual
hosts, sources and destinations.  All this information is
supplied to traffic generators in order to adjust their traffic
profiles.  In conjunction with the ability of LARIAT to set a
victim machine to a particular state (certain users, accounts
and directories), the aggregate content of background traffic
can be completely specified permitting the emulation of a
wide variety of environments. 
LARIAT was generated as part of a government project and
is not publicly available.  LARIAT is a very sophisticated and
advanced test and evaluation environment and serves as an
excellent reference for ideas that need to be incorporated into
an open source tool that is widely available to all information
assurance researchers and developers.
C. Nidsbench and IDS Wakeup
Nidsbench is a Network Intrusion Detection System Test
Suite that has not been significantly changed or updated since
it was first released in 1999.  It is a tool kit that was intended
for use in testing network intrusion systems and algorithms.  It
assumes that the systems under test are passive.  In other
words, the intrusion detection systems do not respond to the
network traffic by adjusting the configuration of system [38].
Nidsbench is made up of the components tcpreplay, idtest and
fragrouter.  Fragrouter was used to detection if an attacker
could evade the IDS as it is described in [30].  Tcpreplay’s
purpose was to provide the background traffic by replaying
prerecorded traffic.  Idtest is the strength of this tool in that it
actually attempts exploits as opposed to vulnerability scanners
that look for only for attack symptoms [38].
D. IDSwakeup
IDSwakeup is another group of tools built to test intrusion
detection systems [43] very much like Nidsbench.  It
generates false attacks, which resemble well known attacks in
order to determine if the systems will produce false alarms.  It
should be clear that this is not a scanner but a false positive
test utility [44]. It is published under a BSD-style license [43].
The program consists of IDSwakeup and utilizes hping and
iwu.  IDSwakeup is the starting script and allows the user to
choose which attack or attacks to imitate.  Hping is used to
send arbitrary packets.   Iwu sends a buffer as a datagram.
Source and destination addresses and TTL are changeable.
 
E. Flame Thrower
Flame Thrower is commercial load stress tool used to
identify network infrastructure weaknesses.  It produces actual
transactions in order to test network infrastructure and
applications.  It supports HTTP/HTTPS 1.0, 1.1 and SSL with
over 32,000 URL definitions.  It can emulate over two million
IP addresses [25]. FirewallStressor, which is part of the Flame
Thrower environment, will measure throughput under attack
conditions such as SYN Flood Attack, IP Spoofing Attack,
CRC Error Packets, ICMP attack, LAND attack, Ping of
Death attack, Trin00, Short Frame Packets, Tear Drop Attack,
Illegal TCP/IP Packets, and Long Frame Packets. Flame
Thrower is intended for testing firewalls [25]. 
F. WebAvalanche/WebReflector
WebAvelanch and WebReflector are two commercial
network appliances, which are used in the testing of intrusion
detection systems [24].  The former is a stress-testing
appliance while the latter emulates the behavior of large Web,
application and data server environments [39].  
WebAvelanche and WebReflector support protocols such
as HTTP 1.0/1.1, SSL, RTSP/RTP and FTP while allowing
for the modeling of user behavior.  The environment can
maintain over a million connections, which will appear to
come from different IP addresses.  The environment will
measure percent dropped packets, latencies, maximum number
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of users and new user arrival rates [39].  
G. Tcpreplay
Tcpreplay is a utility that allows captured traffic to be
played back on a network at different speeds. According to
[47] “this program was written in the hopes that a more
precise testing methodology might be applied to the area of
network intrusion detection, which is still a black art at best”.
Tcpreplay replays files captured in tcpdump or snoop formats.
H. Fragrouter
This is an attack generation tool.  It is recommended for
testing anti-evasion techniques and fragmentation queues [24].
“Fragrouter is a program for routing network traffic in such a
way as to elude most network intrusion detection systems”
[24].  In [24] techniques using fragmentation to elude
intrusion detection systems were explained. 
I. Hping2
Hping2 is a command-line packet assembler and analyzer
[29].  Hping2 is distributed under GNU GPL license for
Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD and Solaris platforms.
Hping2 allows one to create and transmit custom ICMP, UDP,
and TCP packets. Hping2 may be used to fingerprint remote
operating systems.
J. Iperf 
Iperf measures bandwidth, delay jitter and datagram loss.
Measurements can be done using representative traffic
streams.  Iperf may be used as a background traffic source for
intrusion detection environments [33,34].
III. ISSUES IN GENERATING REALISTIC EVALUATION
ENVIRONMENTS
The problem of traffic generation may be divided is into
two issues.  The first is concerned with background traffic.  It
consists of flows that do not carry malicious payload.  The
second issue tackles the actual testing of intrusion detection
systems with attacks.  These two types of flows are mixed and
presented to an intrusion detection system for processing. The
decoupling of the two types of flows has allowed intrusion
detection evaluators a great degree of flexibility.  It is
generally accepted that the most optimal background traffic is
unprocessed, real flows encountered in an actual network.  It
is abundant.  It requires no effort from the tester to generate.
It could not be more realistic. It contains no harmful artifacts
such as duplicate addresses coming from different locations,
which would confuse some switches.  It is easy to vary.
The attack traffic, on the other hand, is based on databases,
which serve as repositories for malicious flows [6,7][46].
These databases require effort to maintain and update.  Attack
density can be changed real time, which is impossible with
canned traffic.  There is real time generation.  The traffic is
easy to vary.  The insertion of “cessation times” is relatively
simple.  Cessation times between attacks are relatively
important in order to distinguish between the effects of attacks
when those are similar.  Again evaluators have full control of
the attack stream.
At the moment, it is very expensive to run an exhaustive
test of all attacks known.  There are diminishing returns in the
confidence of an intrusion detection system after a certain
number of attacks have been attempted.  A suggestion is to
attempt a representative subset of attacks from each category.
This is called equivalence partitioning [19]. However, that
introduces the problem of taxonomy [40].  Current work
seems to indicate that classification methods using
vulnerabilities, signatures and intrusion techniques to lead to
imperfect class definitions [19]. Both of the schemes would
ensure that a wide range of test cases would be selected.
Therefore, it is recommended to use the security policies
already in place as guidelines in the determining which attacks
to launch again the intrusion detection system under
evaluation. Existing taxonomies should be employed as a tool
to guarantee the variety of the attacks [18]. 
Another disadvantage has to do with regulatory restriction
on user traffic.  The reason DARPA created “pseudo users”
was that actual traffic contained sensitive or classified
information.  Privacy laws may require sanitizing traffic
before use for testing, thereby invalidating it’s utility. 
 The authors of this paper requested permission from our
own academic organization to sniff and analyze the traffic on
our own subnet going into and out of our own research
laboratory network that consists of approximately 20
machines behind our own Ethernet switch. This request was
denied.  Academic departmental computer support personnel
gave the reason as that of data “privacy”. Thus, we were
unable to gain access to our own machine’s traffic for the
purposes of network intrusion algorithm development.
There are a number of environmental factors which affect
evaluation results and which should be isolated as part of the
testing methodology.  The effect of networking applications
such as firewalls, proxy servers and shared networks restrict
the types of traffic encountered in the network. A system
whose attributes are to be evaluated should be tested in
different network environments.  For example in some
network environments, non-symmetrical routing may be in
use. In this type of network environment, only inbound or
outbound traffic may be seen. This will radically affect a
network intrusion detection algorithm’s capability. In any
event the network architecture and topology used in the
evaluation must be selected carefully. Different algorithms
and methodologies will perform differently in different
network topologies [13].
An environment related suggestion is to avoid using hosts
which carry the intrusion detection systems under test as
victims.  If the use of the host running the intrusion detection
system as a victim is necessary, multiple tests varying the
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underlying operating system are suggested.  It is conceivable
that the performance would vary as well.  However, the
proposition is based on the fact that current operating systems
lack basic security mechanisms (trusted path and protected
path [28]), which imply that security software level on the
application is built on “sand” [28].  Attacks could cause the
intrusion detection systems crash and thus incomplete testing.
Furthermore, attacks could change the environment the
intrusion detection system operates in by effecting other
network equipment such as router and firewall [28] [13].
Currently testing is limited to case-by-case scenarios.
Components and specific situations can be evaluated but true-
life performance conclusions would not be advised. The use
of real network data as background to injected attacks
provides closer to reality response and is highly recommended
as an alternative to pseudo traffic generators.   The 1998 and
1999 DARPA approach was a significant effort to intrusion
detection benchmarking unmatched in its attempt to provide a
realistic environment for evaluation.  However, it has
inadequacies and is not a good approach by itself.  The traffic
traces generated from that effort and later published required a
lot of rework in order to be reused by others.  In addition, the
statistical models for the users that created the background
traffic were approximations that do not generalize well.
In an effort to side step the high cost of creating new user
models every time a new test is needed, tests attempted to
reuse the traffic traces from previous tests.  More specifically,
an attacking machine replays the traffic (using a tool such as
tcpreplay) recorded during a live test.  A number of sites on
the Internet published traces of attack traffic from
“hackathons” and other tests.  One of those sites is [42].
According to [8] more than 90 sites downloaded all or part of
the 1998 packet traces from the Lincoln Labs website with the
intension to use it as aid to new product development. Speeds
for traffic generation are limited by hard drive access times.
High-speed problems occur beyond the 100 MB traffic
because of the bandwidth of hard drives.  Problems start at 20-
40 MB/sec [22].  It is not possible to conduct high speed, high
volume tests with these tools.  Additionally, it is hard to use
this type of traffic when the network contains components that
respond to changing conditions on the network by adjusting
the configuration of different equipment.  Changes in
configuration would have no effect given that the traffic
stream is fixed [11][26].   
IV. EXAMPLES OF INTRUSION DETECTION EVALUATION
ENVIRONMENTS
In the following subsections, we summarize five
environments that have been used to evaluate intrusion
detection systems. While these are not all of the example
environments that we are aware of, they are representative of
the techniques being used.
A. DARPA Like Environment
In the first example, a comparison of a signature based
system and a DARPA research system relying on statistical
techniques was desired. The environment focused on DOS
attacks.  The evaluation environment was trying to answer the
following questions:
• Are there regions of operation where the attack
tools can degrade performance while escaping
detection? [3]
• Does the intrusion detection system with the
statistical techniques have an advantage over the
signature base system?
• In the case that the intrusion detection system had
the ability to respond would it be effective?
The dependent variables used were:
• Sufficiency of information provided by the system
for diagnostic purposes.
• Proper identification of attack source.
The test set up consisted of 5 components:
• Traffic was generated in the same way as in the
DARPA 1998 test bed [4].
• The victim machine was “an anonymous FTP
server running on a Sun UltraSparc-1 using a
Solaris 2.5 operating system.” [3]
• Attack Injection programs placed attacks on the
network in a scalable and predictable manner
degrading the performance of the victim machine
proportionally to the level of the attack.  An in
house tool was used which opened up connections
on the server without closing them.  The rate of
attacks was adjustable in order to test of minimum
level of detection [3].
• The in house reference programs counted the
number of hung connection at the victim server as
a measure of attack effectiveness. They used a
metric called virulence.  Virulence described the
intensity of an attack situation [3].
• The evaluation method was to use 10, 15, 30, 40
and 60 attacking hosts each utilizing rates of
varying rates of attacks per second.  The two
systems were evaluated under 20 test conditions.
In permutations the percentage of detected hosts
was measured [3].
B. Custom Software
In the second example, a software platform was developed
that simulates intrusions and tests IDS effectiveness [18].
This approach to the problem was to evaluate an intrusion
detection system just like any another application. The
evaluation criteria that were used included [18]:
• Broad Detection Range: measured the ability of
the system to detect different type of intrusions.
• Economy in resource usage: measured
consumption of computer resources by the
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intrusion detection system.
• Resilience to stress: looked at operational
impairment in the case of high computing activity.
The benchmark platform was base on Expect and Tool
Command Language Distributed Programming (TCL-DP)
package.  Expect was used to simulate users performing basic
operations such as Telnet and FTP.  In addition, a record-and-
replay feature supplemented the creation of tests through the
replay of script execution.  Close attention was placed on
concurrency and control in order to produce repeatable tests
and results [18]. The intrusion detection system was installed
on a Sun workstation that was connected to a LAN segment.
The testers performed attack identification tests during stress
tests. Some of the attacks involved password file transmission
to remote hosts, password cracking, and password dictionary
attacks and exploits go gain super user access [18].
C. Advanced Security Audit Trail Analysis on Unix
The third example was part of an experiment concerning
the evaluation of distributed intrusion detection systems called
Advanced Security audit trail Analysis on uniX (ASAX).  The
purpose of the evaluation was to assess the reliability and
efficiency of ASAX [1]. The test is interesting for two
reasons.  The test network was part of an actual network.  The
tests took place at a student cluster of Unix computers.
Secondly, ASAX performed only the analysis of the data not
the actual collection.  The test consisted of the following
scenarios [1]:
• Trojan horse: executable files with commands
accessing unauthorized paths.
• Attempted break-ins: unsuccessful connection
attempts.
• Masquerading: many identity changes.
• Suspicious network connections: connections
received from 
• Black listed addresses.
• Nosing: numerous moves through directories.
• Privilege abuse: remote connections reading files
such as netrc.
• Exploitation of an lpr flaw.
• Leakage: consultation of certain files.
Measurements concentrated on a central machine.
Performance was determined with and without the intrusion
detection system for the duration of a month. The detection
ability of the system was evaluated based on the intrusions the
testers tried.  
D. Vendor Independent Testing Lab
 The fourth example is an environment created by the NSS
group, an independent network and security testing facility.
They perform Intrusion Detection Systems testing and have
issued a test report, which contain information on 16 IDS
systems [41]. NSS tests a broad range of features of intrusion
detection systems.  They look at convenience, which include
ease of installation, deployment and management.  Moreover,
they are interested in the user interface; how is the reporting
occurring and alerts delivered.  Part of the evaluation is the
enforcement of the company’s security policy through the
IDS.  Attack signatures are important for many systems, so a
portion of their tests is dedicated to finding how many are
supported, whether custom ones are allowed and how these
are updated. Some systems provide corrective action during
an attack.  Thus NSS tests the effectiveness of the
methodology responses.  Emphasis is placed on a related issue
such as forensics.  The abilities of an intrusion detection
system to capture, provide protocol and record an attack are
appraised.  Accuracy and depth of prevention advice is
another metric.  Finally, peripheral issues like licensing,
documentation and log management are looked at [41].
The NSS’s test set up consisted of Pentium III 1GHz PCs
each with 768 MB RAM running Windows 2000 SP2,
FreeBSD 4.4 or Red Hat 6.2/7.1 were used for the tests.  Each
machine was clean installed after each test from a Symantec
Ghost image.  The computers were connected via 100Mbit
Ethernet with CAT 5 cabling, Intel NetStructure 40T routing
Switches and Intel auto-sensing 10/100 network cards.  Intel
provided all the necessary drivers.  Each intrusion detection
system was installed on a dual-homed PC on each subnet as
the vendor instructed.   No firewalls were used to protect each
subnet.  Intrusion detection sensors were connected on
interface of the PC in order to monitor traffic. If the system
supported stealth operation, it was enabled.   On a second
interface was connected a management console.  These
interfaces were aggregated on a separate network to ensure
communication with the sensors even under heavy network
loads.  There were many intrusion detection systems placed
under multiple subnets connected to a router and an open
firewall in order to test management features [41]. NSS
performed five types of tests described below [41]:
• Attack recognition: during which a range of
exploits and scans were run using various
commercial and “underground utilities” such as
nmap, targa, netcat, hping, aggressor, nessus and
many more including in house programs in C.  The
attacks used covered’ port scans, denial of service,
Trojans, web, FTP, SMTP, POP3, ICMP and
finger.  Attacks were aimed at a variety of
machines with different operating systems and
were initiated internally to the subnet the intrusion
detection system was on with the exception of
fragrouter. The problem of a baseline was
addressed with the establishment of certain
assumptions.  First assumption was that the system
should be able to detect the attack in the absence
of background traffic and IP fragmentation.  Of
course, all necessary target applications and
servers were installed so as to create victim
responses and thus aid detection.  NSS dealt with
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the problem of which and how many attacks to
launch by selecting a representative sample.  The
selection criteria were how common, well
publicized an attack was as well as if there were
already existing tools which employed it.   Future
work is done to include attacks from SAN top 20
and/or ICAT top 10 vulnerability lists.  This is
expected to increase focus on latest, never seen
before attacks, which require new information-
gathering and analysis techniques.
• Performance under load: these are basic stress
tests.  For example a simple Back Orifice ping is
utilized to send a stream of 10,000 Back Orifice
pings.  In conjunction, a listening server is
installed in order to count the number of pings
received.  The test compared the number of pings
sent with the number of pings detected under high
loads [41]. The actual test consisted of a baseline
test and repetition of the above procedure for a
number of network utilizations.  The baseline
consisted of the ping test without any background
traffic.  One would expect that all pings would be
detected if there were no background traffic.
Subsequently, background traffic was varied. 64-
byte packets with valid source and destination IP
addresses and ports were sent to evaluate the raw
sniffing capability of the intrusion detection
system.  The test was repeated for network loads
of 25, 50, 75 and 100 per cent.  For the same rates
mixed traffic utilizing a variety of packet sizes and
protocols was attempted.  Finally, 1514-byte
packets were attempted again for the same variety
network loads.  Traffic generation was achieved by
means of Adtech AX/4000 Broadband Test
System with 10/100Mbps modules and SmartBits
SMB6000 with LAN-3131A 10/100Mbps
SmartMetrics and LAN-3310A 10/100/1000Mbps
TeraMatrics cards.    
• IDS evasion techniques: intrusion detection
systems were tested for their resistance to anti-
evasion techniques.  The baseline was set through
IP forwarding common attacks across a router.
Then fragrouter was employed in order to attempt
evasion techniques including: ordered and out-of-
order 8-byte IP fragments, ordered and out-of-
order 8-byte IP fragments with duplicate
fragments.  Additionally, whisker was used to run
basic WWW CGI scan of target machines. Some
of the attacks used were: URL encoding, fake
parameter, premature URL ending and / ./directory
insertion [41].
• Stateful operation test: tools such as stick and snot
were used to generate false alerts over a range of
protocols and valid source and destination
addresses.  During that period real attacks were
launched in order to determine whether intrusion
detection systems could still detect real attacks in a
flood of false alarms [41].
• Host performance: Network load, CPU and
memory utilizations were monitored during high
alert attacks in order to estimate impact of the host
carrying the intrusion detection system [41]. 
E. Trade Magazine Evaluation
Finally we mention a trade magazine evaluation performed
on seven intrusion detection systems [27].  This test is
included here because of the interesting approach the
designers of the test took in implementing it.  They placed the
intrusion detection systems in the production network of an
Internet service provider.  Normal traffic on the ISP’s network
served as background traffic for testing.  The average network
utilization was in the range of 9 to 12 Mbps traveling on nine
T1 lines. Instead of generating attacks, the testers deployed
four machines, which had old, unpatched versions of
Windows 2000 Server, Windows NT 4.0 Server, Red Hat
Linux 6.2 and Sun Solaris 2.6.   These machines would attract
attackers who in turn would generate attack traffic.   The
article authors reported that the machines were compromised
as soon as they were deployed [27].
 
The intrusion detection systems used covered a wide range
in terms of technology.  The systems include appliance
intrusion detection systems, signature and anomaly detection
including open source as well as proprietary systems.  Each
system had at least one sensor installed in order to monitor
traffic and generate alarms.  Furthermore, the designers tried
to emulate the management methodology in production
networks where of the intrusion detection systems sensors
report to alerts to management consoles in other subnets [27].
The metrics used by the designers were accuracy, ease of
use, and uptime.  Uptime was defined as the number of times
a system ceased to function in a period of 30 days.  Accuracy
was the term used for true positive and negatives as opposed
to false positives and negatives.  However, in this test the
definition of what constitutes a detectable attack is different.
They considered an attack to be any compromise of any
computing resource on the ‘protected’ network. This is not the
same as an attempted attack; if there was no compromise, the
intrusion detection system is essentially reporting a
vulnerability that does not exist [27].   Ease of use was
another metric they used.  It was applied to the amount of
information supplied by the intrusion detection system for
each alert.  How easy it was to figure out which alerts required
immediate attention was also considered [27]. No explanation
was given on the determination of the baseline.  However
since this was a comparative test, the author conjecture that
the designers of the test were not interested in specific
measurements only on which system performed best relative
to the others [27]. 
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V. CONCLUSION
Reviewing existing intrusion detection system testing and
benchmarking tools and methodologies, it becomes clear that
present approaches to comparative intrusion detection testing
and evaluation are inadequate.  We do not believe that there is
ever going to be a comprehensive test nor a single
methodology that would examine an intrusion detection
system for every attack, verify its abilities and identify all its
weaknesses [28].  This in essence would be to categorically
solve the problem of intrusion detection.  However, it is
possible to improve on the existing testing and evaluation
practices employed in the field. At present the philosophy is
still that the best way to evaluate any intrusion detection
algorithm is to use live or recorded real traffic from the site
where the algorithm is to be deployed [22]. Although this is a
valid component of test and evaluation, we believe that there
is a real need for a new public domain test and evaluation
methodology that may be used in a more uniform and
repeatable manner.
The 1998 and 1999 DARPA approach was a significant
effort toward intrusion detection benchmarking. That
approach attempted to provide a realistic evaluation
environment.  However, in retrospect, it has inadequacies and
is not really a good environment.  The traffic traces generated
from that effort and later published required a lot of rework in
order to be reused by others.  In addition, the statistical
models used to create the background traffic were
approximations that do not generalize well. 
Recently there has been increased activity in the
development of attack generation tools for intrusion detection
system testing.  Along with that development has been the
creation of tools to be used to assist with the analysis of the
evaluation results [13-23].  We think that the initial
benchmarking of intrusion detection algorithms will move
away from placement on network segments with live actual
network traffic to an all-one-environmental approach once
sophisticated enough tools exit.  An example of a recent
attempt at this is Thor [48]. Thor automatically launches
attacks and collects the alarms that the intrusion detection
system generates. Thor has the ability to vary the attacks so as
to try to evade the intrusion detection system. This new
methodology has many obvious advantages over the
traditional methodologies including repeatability and common
test metrics that may be applied by a wide range of intrusion
detection implementers and evaluators.
A new and more capable open source evaluation
methodology is needed in the intrusion detection community.
This new methodology must be able to generate realistic
network background traffic through artificial generation as
well as merging capability with existing or live network
traffic.  The synthetic component of background traffic must
be generated as realistic traffic streams that included full
payloads. Typical network simulators like ns do not at present
incorporate the ability to generate realistic data from the
standpoint of full traffic stream generation, thus the most
popular open source network simulation tool will require
major enhancements if it is to be used as the basis for traffic
generation. In addition, the massive amounts of traffic that
must be generated require a parallel and distributed simulator
in order to be able to generate the large amounts of traffic
required. The ability to merge in existing traffic trace files
either from previous generation runs or actual traffic capture
files is also required. This allows the continued use of live
network traffic which to date is still the most prevalent test
methodology. This proposed new methodology requires a
strictly controlled and repeatable component and yet also
requires a live environment component capability. The live
environment component must include the ability to inject
attacks in the live traffic component so that a library of attacks
may be injected along with the live traffic component. For
obvious reasons it is not desirable to inject these library
attacks into the actual live network traffic segment, injection
must occur in an isolated test environment that includes the
live traffic component. The capability of the proposed test
environment to generate and respond to traffic in real time
will allow the new methodology to be inserted into existing
test beds. The proposed environment should work
simultaneously with real network segments as well as
captured network segment traffic. The background traffic
generator will require the ability to parse existing traffic traces
and then merge additional background or attack traffic into
repeatable trace files. All of this must occur in real time since
intrusion detection algorithms may adapt or provide feedback
into the network environment. The traffic generation
capabilities must include gigabit traffic generation capability.
Realistic user models and network activity must be
incorporated. The ability to use actual machines along with
simulated machines is also required. As an example, Linux
based machines that act as multiple independent traffic
generators already exist.  Servers offering actual services
should be able to be placed into the proposed environment.
The ability to insert real platforms with standard operating
systems is a requirement since the only way to see
vulnerabilities is to use the actual system under stressful
environments.
Attacks should be maintained in an attack repository such
that they may be inserted into the background traffic activity.
Standard attack and evaluation tools that already exist should
be a part of this attack repository, and they should be able to
execute in the same manner that the tools execute when run in
a traditional stand-alone configuration. An automated method
for managing attacks is also required. This automated method
would have the ability to inject the attacks at specific times or
as a result of specific network conditions. For each attack
executed, the environment should have the ability to report the
reactions of the intrusion detection algorithms.
The tools and methodologies needed for uniform testing of
intrusion detection systems do not yet exist in the public
domain at a level necessary for performing the necessary
comparative tests and evaluations of new algorithms. There is
a great need for an open source traffic generation and attack
insertion environment that may be uniformly used for
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intrusion detection evaluations. The end result of a new
methodology having the capabilities we have proposed would
be a uniform test and evaluation capability that could be used
to make meaningful comparisons between various intrusion
detection algorithms and systems. At present, this does
capability does not exist.
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